This paper examines the impact of global financial crises on the Australian economy and how monetary and fiscal policy may be used to manage economic downturns that result. To do so, it presents a straightforward analytical framework incorporating financial wealth, exchange rate expectations, foreign demand and interest rate risk to analyse the key role played by the nominal exchange rate in insulating national income from the worst effects of foreign financial crises. In the event the economy is not fully insulated by exchange rate depreciation, it shows that, in principle, monetary policy is a superior instrument to fiscal stimulus for restoring aggregate demand to the full employment level. Since monetary policy is not handicapped by numerous problems that render fiscal stimulus less effective, it should normally be considered a sufficient instrument on its own.
Introduction
This paper develops a framework for analysing the macroeconomic impact of foreign financial crises, such as the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2008-09 and the Asian crisis of 1997-98, on the Australian economy. Like a number of economies in the world, Australia was safeguarded from the GFC by the underlying strength of its domestic banking and financial systems. Nonetheless, the GFC contributed to a marked slowdown in Australia's GDP, reduced working hours and a rise in unemployment. What is most apparent here is that during the December 2008 and March 2009 quarters, when the impact of the GFC on the real economy was greatest, the most notable quarter to quarter turnarounds in aggregate expenditure were in investment, including inventories, and the trade balance, not in household consumption or government spending, though the latter may have been lower without stimulus.
Theory tells us that exchange rates and trade balances are closely related. Yet the role played by the exchange rate in shielding the Australian economy from the full force of the GFC via the trade balance turnaround has been much neglected in analysis and official commentary on this topic, which has tended to emphasise the impact on the consumption and government spending, changes in which were minimal. Continued strong export growth to China also played a role. derives new results about the effectiveness of fiscal policy, at odds with those obtained from the textbook model under the assumption of perfect capital mobility. We begin with aggregate production and spending before turning to the monetary side of the economy.
Real Sector Linkages
National income equals expenditure on consumption, investment, autonomous government spending, and exports less imports. Hence,
where is income taxes, τ τ − y is national disposable income, q is wealth, r is the domestic interest rate, g is government purchases, e is the effective exchange rate, and * y is foreign demand for domestically produced goods and services.
We assume that in initial equilibrium, the economy is at full employment national income, defined as that level of output associated with the natural rate of unemployment. Both foreign and domestic inflation is presumed minimal and within the central bank's target range, which implies that short run nominal exchange rate variation fully translates to real exchange rate variation.
Next assume consumption, investment, export and import functions, with all national accounts variables expressed in real terms.
are autonomous consumption, investment, exports and imports respectively, α is the marginal propensity to consume, υ measures the responsiveness of consumption to changes in wealth, q, γ gauges the responsiveness of investment to the interest rate, σ is the responsiveness of investment to changes in asset prices or wealth, * y is foreign demand for domestically produced goods and services, ξ is the responsiveness of exports to the exchange rate, μ is the marginal propensity to import, and ς is the responsiveness of imports to the exchange rate.
The domestic interest rate, r, is related to an appropriately weighted foreign interest rate via uncovered interest parity, inclusive of a time varying risk premium. Since , expected exchange rate depreciation is
, we can express this relationship as
where * r is the foreign interest rate, θ is the time varying risk premium, and f is the expected future spot exchange rate.
Substituting (6) into (3), adding relations (2)-(5), and solving for therefore yields y
This expression provides a basis for analysing short run national income determination in exchange rate -national income space. However, to make the following exposition consistent with the exchange rate measure used in Australian financial markets, the nominal effective exchange rate is redefined as e E 1 = , such that a rise (fall) in the value of E denotes appreciation (depreciation).
this allows us to draw a downward sloping schedule, labelled the YY schedule in exchange rate-output (or ) space, as shown in Figure 3 . 
which implies, everything else being equal, that a slump in asset prices and hence wealth, expected exchange rate depreciation, and a higher interest risk premium shift the YY schedule leftward, whereas lower foreign interest rates, higher government spending and transfer payments or income tax cuts, shift the schedule rightward.
Figure 3 -General Equilibrium

Monetary Sector Linkages
On the monetary side of the economy, the real demand for cash balances, L, equals the real money supply, so that
Money demand depends positively on national income according to the parameter, κ , and negatively on the domestic interest rate, according to the parameter η, such that,
The national price level is a weighted measure of the price of domestic goods and services, as well as the foreign currency price of imported goods and services, , converted via the exchange rate,
Substituting (6) and (12) into (11) and solving for y, yields
Partially differentiating (13) with respect to the nominal exchange rate, we find
This implies an upward sloping schedule, labelled the MM schedule, can be drawn in exchange rate-national income (or y E − ) space in Figure 3 . Relation (13) also allows us to identify key shift factors. Specifically, since
increases in the domestic money supply, in foreign interest rates, and the risk premium, as well as expected exchange rate depreciation, shift the MM schedule rightwards, everything else equal.
Having established these foundations, it is now possible to examine, first, the impact of foreign financial crises on the economy, and, second, whether fiscal policy or monetary policy should be deployed to speed recovery to full employment national income, .
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The Macroeconomic Impact of Foreign Financial Crises
In the first instance, a foreign financial crisis, such as the GFC, shatters consumer and business confidence at home and abroad which causes equity values and financial wealth to plummet, reducing domestic and foreign consumption and investment and foreign demand for exports. In light of the increased risk associated with Australia's reliance on foreign borrowing and sharp fall in international commodity prices, the exchange rate would be expected to depreciate and interest risk premium rise.
Together, in the absence of any discretionary macroeconomic policy response at home or abroad, these factors ( ) cause the YY schedule in Figure 4 to shift leftward, reducing GDP and depreciating the exchange rate. The negative impact of the crisis on GDP would be greatest if the central bank sought to maintain the value of the exchange rate at its pre-crisis level. Under these circumstances, the money supply would need to contract to maintain the exchange rate at , a recession would surely ensue with output falling to level , as shown.
However, under a floating exchange rate, if financial markets expect the exchange rate to depreciate and the risk premium to rise ( ), as depicted in Figure 4 , this simultaneously shifts the MM schedule rightward as well. Hence, the spot exchange rate automatically depreciates markedly, consistent with Australian dollar behaviour during both the GFC in 2008-09 and Asian financial crisis in 1997-98.
As a result, although national income falls below its initial full employment level at , exchange rate depreciation greatly insulates the economy from the foreign financial shock compared to the impact under a managed exchange rate regime. The slopes of the YY and MM schedules determine the degree to which national income falls below the full employment level. 
Fiscal vs Monetary Responses
Macroeconomic Policy Abroad
If foreign central banks immediately implement a co-ordinated response to the financial crisis enveloping their economies by lowering official interest rates, this helps restore consumer and business confidence and arrest asset price falls, thus limiting the magnitude of the leftward shift of the YY schedule through the foreign interest rate, wealth and foreign demand channels.
In reality automatic fiscal stabilisers would also mitigate the aggregate demand slump.
In the absence of any discretionary domestic monetary policy response, lower foreign interest rates, everything else the same, would partially offset any rightward shift of the MM schedule from the effects of expected exchange rate depreciation and higher interest risk premium. To prevent this, the central bank also needs to act quickly by expanding domestic liquidity ( ) in concert with foreign central banks.
Domestic Macroeconomic Policy Response
Should asset prices and wealth quickly rebound of their own accord, consumer and business sentiment would recover, risk aversion in financial markets would diminish, household consumption and private investment would rise and the YY schedule would shift back rightwards over time, without need of further discretionary macroeconomic policy. Taking expansionary monetary and fiscal policies implemented abroad into account as well, any initial domestic liquidity expansion would then have to be rewound to forestall inflationary pressures, consequent on aggregate demand exceeding full employment output at .
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However, if the authorities predict that national output will remain below the full employment level for an extended period, they may contemplate further macropolicy options for speeding recovery. The question then arises as to whether there should be further liquidity expansion, or discretionary fiscal stimulus, to restore aggregate demand to the pre-crisis level. The effects of these alternative macropolicy options can now be examined with reference to Instead of domestic monetary expansion, this framework also suggests that domestic fiscal stimulus can be used, either in the form of higher government spending ( ), reduced income taxes, ( ), or higher income transfers ( ). The last two of these, changes to taxes and transfers, rely on the assumption that household consumption behaves in accordance with the Keynesian consumption function. In Figure 5 , this translates as a rightward shift of the YY schedule which, in principle, could be shifted enough to raise national output from the crisis affected level of back to .
However, the consequence of a discretionary fiscal policy response is worsening international competitiveness via an appreciating exchange rate which rises from to . The trade deficit therefore widens, consistent with the 'twin deficits' hypothesis, compared to the rise in net exports that occurs via monetary expansion and associated real depreciation. Relatedly, the Ricardian equivalence proposition (Barro 1974 , Ricciutti 2003 suggests that households, wary of increased taxes required to pay off newly created public debt in the future, will save today rather than spend. If a dollar of new public debt negates a dollar of consumer spending in this way, tax cuts and welfare payments prove ineffective as a stimulus measure and in the limit case the YY schedule would not shift. Empirical evidence for a range of economies suggests that at least half of the change in fiscal balances in advanced economies has been offset by an opposite change in private saving (Bernheim 1987 , Masson, Bayoumi and Hossein 1998 , Loayaza, Schmidt-Hebbel and Serven 2000 , and Hemming, Kell and Mahfouz 2002 .
Concluding Comments
This paper has presented a framework for considering the impact of external financial crises on the Australia economy which is consistent with the economy's past behaviour during external crisis episodes. It also helps explain Australia's resilience during the 2001 global recession when the Australian dollar fell to a record low against the United States dollar.
It has shown that, in the first instance, the nominal exchange rate plays the pivotal role in insulating national output and employment from the worst effects of external financial shocks.
Monetary and fiscal responses in crisis-source economies, combined with a relaxation of monetary policy domestically, are sufficient for countering the impact of external crises on domestic output and employment.
Of course, Ricardian effects that minimise any YY shift in the first instance obviate the need to borrow abroad. Yet, to the extent that fiscally-induced spending does actually appreciate the exchange rate and widen the trade deficit, foreign debt will rise equivalently and have to be serviced into the future. Unless the rate of return on government stimulus spending exceeds this servicing cost, the additional foreign borrowing will act as a drain on future national income, as proposed in Makin (2009). All in all, fiscally related problems can be avoided by predominantly relying on monetary policy, as happened during the Asian crisis.
